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INTRODUCTION
The topic of executive compensation has attracted increased attention from researchers taking economic and behavioral perspectives (e.g., O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal, 1988; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Zajac, 1990 ; Beatty and Zajac, 1994). The economics-based research, relying primarily on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), emphasizes how contingent compensation contracts for managers that link pay to firm performance can align the interests of chief executive officers (CEOs) and shareholders. The board of directors is responsible for fashioning such contingent contracts and-functions more generally to monitor executive behavior (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The inability of empirical studies to demonstrate a consistently significant relationship between CEO pay and firm performance (Kerr and Bettis, 1987; Jensen and Murphy, 1990), however, has led some researchers to explore more behaviorally oriented explanations for the board's apparent failure to fulfill its nominal function. These studies typically focus on the social, political, or psychological aspects of the CEO-board relationship, such as how the CEOs' relative power over board members may influence cash compensation in the form of salary and bonuses (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Hill and Phan, 1991). The impact of CEO influence on the specific form or composition of CEO compensation contracts, such as long-term incentives versus cash compensation, has received little attention, however, despite the fact that long-term incentives have become an increasingly large proportion of CEOs' total compensation (Jarrell, 1993) . This lihe of behavioral research has also tended to focus on the overtly political aspects of CEO compensation, emphasizing how powerful CEOs are able to pressure boards into giving them higher levels of cash compensation. While this approach has yielded important insights, we believe that current research can be extended to consider 367/Administrative Science Quarterly, 39 (1994): 367-390 how more subtle aspects of political behavior might affect CEO compensation, such as how the symbolic, rather than substantive aspects of CEO compensation may be politically managed to the advantage of powerful CEOs.
In addition, prior research has given only limited consideration to the implications of institutional theory for executive compensation issues. From an institutional perspective, actual compensation practices may differ from formal arrangements (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) . This perspective also suggests that the predictors of whether firms adopt organizational practices like long-term incentive plans may change over time, with technical considerations predicting early adoption and institutional factors predicting later adoption (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) . In effect, institutional theory can be used to complement political theory in developing a symbolic action perspective on CEO compensation. This paper seeks to address each of the issues raised above by focusing on how long-term incentive compensation, the aspect of CEO pay that has been least researched in the organizational literature, lends itself best to a study of symbolic action. The study focuses on how long-term incentive plans (LTIPs), which have been widely promoted by compensation consultants and writers on executive compensation (Meyers, 1981) as an effective means of aligning CEO pay with shareholder interests, may be used symbolically, rather than substantively.
Long-term Incentive Plans
Corporations adopting LTIPs typically emphasize the role of such plans in aligning the interests of top management with those of the firm's owners. Several statements taken from company proxy statements reflect how LTIPs are viewed by corporate boards of directors. For example, in proposing a new LTIP, Alcoa proclaimed in its 1988 proxy statement:
Alcoa's Board of Directors has decided to place an increasing share of management's overall compensation at risk rather than in fixed salaries. The new approach to compensation was recommended by the Board's compensation committee, which is composed solely of outside directors. The board believes that granting stock options, performance shares and [bonuses] will create a more appropriate relationship between compensation and the financial performance of the company.
Similarly, B. F. Goodrich announced an LTIP in its 1990 proxy statement by declaring, "the purpose of this plan is to promote the interests of the shareholders by furthering the long-term performance of the company, contingent upon the meeting of strategic goals which are determined by a committee of the board of directors." LTIPs typically comprise one or more of the following vehicles: stock option plans, stock appreciation rights (SARs), restricted stock, and performance plans. Stock options give executives the right to purchase a certain number of shares at a predetermined price-usually the market value at the time they are granted-within a given time period. Stock appreciation rights are typically attached to option grants and permit executives to exchange options 368/ASQ, September 1994 for a cash payment equal to the stock price less the exercise price.
With restricted stock, an executive is awarded shares of common stock subject to restrictions on sale. These restrictions lapse over a period of years, provided that the executive remains with the firm. Finally, performance plans generally span a three-to six-year performance period and reward executives for meeting specific accounting-based performance goals over that period (Larcker, 1983; Jarrell, 1993) . Grants under a performance plan, which confer the right to receive shares of common stock or cash at a particular date in the future to the extent that the specific performance objectives are met, are typically made in either shares of common stock or stock units, referred to as performance shares and performance units, respectively. The final value of each share is the market price at the end of the award period, while each unit is assigned a fixed dollar value-unrelated to share price-at the beginning of the award period.
In this study, the adoption of a long-term incentive plan refers to the introduction, identifiable as an announcement in proxy statements for purposes of gaining shareholder approval, of a relatively comprehensive incentive program that includes a performance plan, as defined above (Larcker, 1983). Introduction of a performance plan is thus a necessary and sufficient condition for LTIP adoption, although other long-term incentive vehicles may also be introduced. The importance of performance plans as a compensation innovation is documented in Larcker (1983), who argued that these plans can lengthen executives' time horizons and focus their attention on creating shareholder value. J-arrell (1993) also noted that from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, the number of firms adopting such LTIPs has increased significantly. This increase is at least partly attributable to the fact that LTIPs have been touted by compensation consultants and boards of directors as a compensation innovation that aligns CEO interests more closely with those of the firm. As the following discussion suggests, however, LTIPs may also provide symbolic benefits.
The Adoption Versus Use of Long-term Incentive Plans
Although the antecedents and consequences of LTIPs have not received much attention in behavioral research on executive compensation, a number of studies in the financial economics literature have investigated the consequences of LTIP adoption. In particular, research has consistently shown a favorable stock market reaction to the announced adoption of executive incentive plans (Larcker, 1983; Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease, 1985; Tehranian, Travlos and Waegelein, 1987). While an implicit assumption in this literature is that LTIPs will mitigate substantively the agency problem between top managers and owners, an interesting feature of LTIPs is that they typically do not specify any targeted amount of incentive compensation. In fact, the adoption of an LTIP does not guarantee that it will be used at all: A board may announce a new LTIP and then make trivially small grants under the plan or no grants at all.
The adoption of LTIPs may thus constitute an action that is partly or even largely symbolic, representing a possible decoupling of actual compensation practices from formal arrangements (Meyer and Rowan, 1977 (Pfeffer, 1981) . A new incentive plan may signal the board's willingness to reshape executive compensation policy in a way that benefits shareholders. DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 151) offered a similar rationale for the proliferation of quality circles among U.S. firms: "ccompanies adopt these 'innovations' to enhance their legitimacy, to demonstrate that they are at least trying to improve working conditions." Although a variety of innovations could be used to symbolize organizational change or adaptation in response to poor performance, LTIPs offer several advantages over other innovations. They are highly visible, relatively inexpensive, attend specifically to shareholders' interests, and are generally viewed by external constituents as beneficial, as evidenced by the positive stock market reactions found in the event studies discussed above. These advantages can be realized by the LTIP adoption announcement alone, however, independent of actual use. This suggests the following hypothesis: may be motivated by economic or technical needs, later adoption provides legitimacy rather than improved technical performance (Zucker, 1983 ). This general hypothesis has been supported in empirical studies of the adoption of civil service reforms by city governments (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) , the proliferation of city finance agencies (Meyer, Stevenson, and Webster, 1985) , and the adoption of personnel administration programs ( While hypotheses 4a and 4b describe institutional processes in terms of a growing decoupling of actual incentive compensation from formally adopted incentive plans, a more traditional test of institutionalization, focusing on early versus late adoption, is also possible. From an institutional theory perspective, as LTIPs acquire normative or taken-for-granted status as a component of formal compensation contracts, technical motives for adoption, such as poor prior performance, may decline in importance (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Zucker, 1983) . To the extent that late adoption is a normative act, all deliberate motives should become less significant in predicting adoption over time, including the desire by influential CEOs to enhance their reputation 373/ASQ, Septem ber 1994 through formal incentive alignment (Zucker, 1977) . This logic suggests the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 5a (H5a): The strength of the relationship between prior performance and LTIP adoption will decrease over time.
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): The strength of the relationship between CEO influence and LTIP adoption will decrease over time. 
METHOD

Dependent Variables
LTIP adoption. A necessary and sufficient condition for coding a firm as having adopted an LTIP is the adoption of a new performance plan that is aimed at adding multiyear performance incentives, such as performance shares or performance units, to a CEO's compensation contract. If a firm adopted a performance plan along with other long-term incentive vehicles, we also considered it as having adopted an LTIP. In a separate analysis, we examined whether the -empirical findings would be substantively changed if one defined LTIP adoption as the introduction of only performance plans, which represented 66 percent of all adoptions in our sample. This reduced sample excluded so-called "omnibus plans," representing 11 percent of all adoptions, which give boards the right to grant any long-term incentive vehicle; it also excluded LTIPs comprising performance plans and one or more additional vehicles, such as restricted stock, which represented 23 percent of all 374/ASQ, September 1994 adoptions. We found that the empirical results were substantively unchanged.
We analyzed proxies before and after the LTIP adoption date to confirm the newness and uniqueness of coded LTIP adoptions. To ensure that the LTIPs we documented were in fact new, we checked proxies from the date of adoption backward to 1972 for any earlier references to performance plans. We also examined each coded LTIP adoption and observed that in 81 percent of the cases (339 of 419), there was explicit mention of the LTIP's newness and/or direct evidence that LTIPs (i.e., performance plans) had not been previously adopted. Excluding the remaining 19 percent had no substantive effect on the results reported in this study, as most of the excluded cases were stand-alone performance-unit plans, which were also the only type of LTIP in our study not requiring a shareholder vote.
We followed prior research (Larcker, 1983; Jarrell, 1983) in treating LTIP adoption as a unique event and LTIPs as a discrete compensation innovation whose origin can be traced to the early 1970s and whose diffusion continued through the 1980s. Given the definition of LTIP adoption, specified above as the introduction of a performance plan, the only type of "repeated events" observed in this sample were either requests for additional shares (i.e., for issuance under the plan) and/or enlargement of the current plan to encompass additional vehicles, such as adding restricted stock to an existing performance plan based on shares. Neither of these events really constitute the adoption of a new LTIP and therefore do not represent repeated adoptions.
LTIP use. To test hypotheses predicting the likelihood of LTIP use, we created a dichotomous measure, coded as 1 if any units or shares were granted during the year of adoption or the year thereafter, and 0 otherwise. An observation period of two years rather than just one year was used because some companies make long-term incentive grants biannually. A longer observation period seems unnecessary, given that firms intending to use LTIPs have no obvious incentive to delay implementation. Nonetheless, we also examined in a separate analysis whether our results were somehow sensitive to the two-year observation period chosen. Results showed that extending the time period for observing grants to three or four years had no substantive effect on the multivariate results.
The vast majority (94 percent) of the 419 LTIP-adopting firms in our study reported the use or non-use of the LTIP. In only 6 percent of the cases did we infer from the lack of any reference to grants made that the LTIP was not implemented. Firms coded as non-users or nonimplementors in our sample typically reported the absence of grants by reporting a value of 0 in a tabular display or by verbally stating that no grants were made under the plan. Some verbal references to use or non-use were less clear. For instance, firms sometimes stated in the second year that no grants had been made under the plan, but they did not say whether grants were made in the first year. Although this statement implies non-use in both years, some ambiguity remains. Similarly, firms were sometimes ambiguous about precisely which long-term incentive plan(s) were not used in a given year (e.g., option plan only or option plan and performance plan). To ensure that our results were not contingent on the inclusion or exclusion of these relatively ambiguous cases, we conducted separate analyses with these cases excluded (18 percent), while also excluding the 6 percent that made reference to grants. The multivariate findings were substantively unchanged.
To test hypotheses about the magnitude of LTIP use, the average annual grant value, as a proportion of total compensation, was calculated for the two-year period. While vesting in restricted stock is not contingent on firm performance (Crystal, 1991), the value of these shares still depends on stock price. Thus, restricted stock introduces greater uncertainty into a CEO's contract than does cash compensation. The value of restricted stock grants was therefore included in calculating the size of LTIP grants. The specific formulas used for valuation purposes are shown in the Appendix. We used event history analysis to model the occurrence of LTIP adoption, the first event, and for the reduced set of adopting firms, we modelled the causal process that determined LTIP use, the second event. The hypotheses on LTIP adoption were tested using continuous-time event history analysis with time-varying covariates (Allison, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991) . Event history analysis is appropriate when the data is longitudinal and the phenomenon of interest is a discrete event, as is LTIP adoption. Since specific dates of adoption were available and adoption was observed over a relatively long time interval, minimizing the number of tied events, a continuous-time, proportional hazards model was used (Cox, 1972; Yamaguchi, 1991) 
. The Cox model takes the following form: h(t) = q(t)exp[bX(t)] where h(t) is the hazard rate of adoption at time t, q(t) is the unspecified function of time dependence, X(t) is a vector of covariates, and b is the corresponding vector of coefficients. Because the model is log-linear, a one-unit change in X increases the hazard rate by exp(b).
A limitation of the Cox model is that it uses information only about the relative order of event times, rather than information about the specific timing of events, thus lowering the efficiency of parameter estimates. The loss of efficiency, however, is generally small for large samples (Yamaguchi, 1991) . A more serious potential problem would be the presence of left-censored observations, when the event occurs before the study period. If a very large portion of the sample adopts prior to the observation period, serious bias in parameter estimates can occur. Fortunately, our sample begins with the year 1972, which approximates the onset of LTIP adoption (Larcker, 1983; Jarrell, 1993); thus, bias in parameter estimates should be minimal. The data were arranged by firm-year, beginning on January 1, 1972, and updated annually. Since adoption was treated here as an absorbing state, firms were removed from the risk set upon adoption. Also, 81 cases were right-truncated due to mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers during the risk period. The time of adoption was recorded as the date of the annual meeting. All independent variables were lagged by one year; thus, the risk of adoption during each year depended on the firm, CEO, and board characteristics in the prior year (Davis, 1991 and chair positions, and the portion of the board composed of outsiders appointed after the CEO), the higher the rate of LTIP adoption. Hypothesis 3 is also strongly supported: Prior performance (market returns and ROA) is significantly and negatively related to firms' propensity to adopt an LTIP.
Hypotheses 5a and 5b predicted decreasing effects for prior performance and CEO influence on the rate of LTIP adoption over time. Results in the second column of Table 2 provide strong support for hypothesis 5a: The effect of prior performance, as measured by total stock returns and return on assets, on the rate of LTIP adoption significantly decreases over time. Results in the third column of Table 2 support hypothesis 5b: Prior performance interacts with time in predicting the rate of adoption for three of the four influence measures. While we tested the interaction terms in two separate models for presentational purposes and to avoid multicollinearity problems, we also found that t-statistics remained significant in the full model. Overall, then, it appears that deliberate motives for adoption have decreased in importance as LTIPs have become a taken-for-granted component of formal compensation contracts.
Results of the logistic regression analysis, which models the likelihood of LTIP use for those firms adopting LTIPs, are shown in Table 3 . The findings strongly support hypothesis 2a, which proposed that CEO influence would be negatively related to the actual use of LTIPs that had been adopted. Three of the four indicators of CEO influence (CEO tenure, combined CEO and chair positions, and appointment of outsiders) are significantly and negatively associated with the likelihood of LTIP use during the first two years after adoption. While CEO influence is thus positively related to the formal adoption of LTIPs (Table 2) , it is negatively related to the actual use of LTIPs (Table 3) . Table 3 
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Year directors, was unrelated to both LTIP adoption and use. Overall, the set of significant findings with respect to H1, H2a, and H2b is quite consistent with the argument that powerful CEOs are able to influence boards of directors to adopt, but not to use long-term incentive plans.
Consistent with H4b, for those firms that did make grants, the grants were smaller among late adopters than among early adopters. The tests of H4a and H4b, when taken together, thus suggest that the separation between formal adoption and actual use of LTIPs was greater for later adopters than for earlier adopters. To control for the possibility that particular macro-economic factors, such as the stock market crash of 1987, might be affecting these findings, we eliminated 1987 adopters, reestimated the models, and found that the results were essentially unchanged. A more complete understanding of the effect of performance on LTIP adoption and use (H3) emerges from a comparison of Table 2 with Tables 3 and 4 . The findings show that prior performance, while significantly related to the rate of LTIP adoption (Table 2) , is not significantly related to the use of LTIPs (Table 3) . Tables 3 and 4 show that this holds true for both measures of LTIP use, i.e., the likelihood and relative size of LTI grants. Taken together, these results are consistent with H3, which proposed that performance deficiencies may be met with more symbolic than substantive organizational actions. Finally, although analyzing adoption and use separately appears to represent the most appropriate modeling approach, for the reasons cited earlier (Allison, 1984) , we also considered an alternative form of modelling the effects of CEO influence and firm performance on LTIP adoption and use. We created a dependent variable called "adoption and non-use of LTIPs" and conducted a discrete-time event history analysis on the 6314 firm-years of data. The results of this analysis were consistent with those reported here: CEO influence was positively related to the likelihood of adopting and not using LTIPs for the same three influence measures (t-statistics ranged from 2.18 to 3.54). Also, both measures of prior performance were significantly and negatively related to the likelihood of adopting but not using LTIPs (t-statistics ranged from 2.07 to 3.28).
DISCUSSION
The results of this study suggest that there is a separation of symbol and substance in the composition of CEO compensation contracts, and that behavioral theories addressing the political and/or institutional use of organizational symbols can predict the likelihood and extent of that separation (Pfeffer, 1981; DiMaggio, 1988; Edelman, 1990; Friedland and Alford, 1991) . While institutional and symbolic action theorists commonly invoke the separation of substance and symbol in organizational activity, large-scale empirical observation of this phenomenon is relatively rare. Moreover, in raising the possibility of symbolic action in the context of executive compensation, we use a theoretical framework not yet considered in the existing behavioral and economics-based literature on executive compensation.
The first set of results addresses the effect of relative power in the CEO-board relationship on the likelihood of LTIP adoption and subsequent implementation. In general, the findings provide strong and consistent evidence that firms with relatively influential CEOs are more likely to decouple LTIP adoption and use. While agency theory contributes to a partial understanding of this phenomenon by specifying the personal preferences that could motivate non-use of formally adopted LTIPs, such as CEO risk-aversion (Beatty and Zajac, 1994), it cannot explain why firms announce but do not use LTIPs or why the separation is more likely to be found in firms having more influential CEOs. Instead, this finding is more consistent with a political perspective, in which CEOs exercise influence subtly by encouraging the adoption of LTIPs while discouraging or limiting their actual use. By personally associating themselves with practices that display concern for shareholders' interests, CEOs enhance their legitimacy with stockholders and other stakeholders, signalling board control and the absence of any agency problem (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi and Reiss, 1981; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . Thus, CEOs with the ability to influence the board to adopt but not use-or only limitedly use-LTIPs can simultaneously enhance the legitimacy of their formal compensation contract, while satisfying their personal preferences for noncontingent compensation.
It is possible to attempt to construct an efficiency explanation for the observed decoupling of LTIP adoption and use. One such argument might involve transaction-cost economizing, whereby firms are seen as adopting but not fully using LTIPs as a way to economize on the transaction costs of seeking shareholder approval for subsequent plans. But such an argument could only explain why some elements of an LTIP were not used, but not all. Since our analysis of the decoupling of substance and symbolism in LTIPs examines only those cases in which none of the elements are used, a transaction-cost economizing explanation does not apply.
Another rational or efficiency explanation might be that simply adopting LTIPs-without actually using them-is a sufficient threat to ensure appropriate managerial behavior. Such an argument takes a game theoretic perspective, in which the board can credibly threaten the CEO. This argument is logically problematic, however, in at least one important respect: The alleged implied threat of adopting but not using LTIPs is either credible or it is not. If it is not, then it is irrelevant and would have no effect on a CEO's behavior. If it is credible, however, and assuming the targeted party is rational, game theory suggests that the targeted party will act appropriately without the other party even having to make the threat. Because rational CEOs would know their board could credibly threaten them simply by adopting LTIPs, it would be rational for the CEO to behave appropriately whether or not the board adopted LTIPs. Even in this simple model, the rational board will not need to adopt LTIPs, since the threat to adopt is as effective as the actual adoption, which is as effective as actual implementation. If adoption of LTIPs is a credible threat, then we should not observe rational boards adopting LTIPs at all. Since there is no rational game theoretic logic for LTIP adoption, there will be no rational logic to expect any decoupling of adoption and implementation. Thus, a credible threat story cannot explain the decoupling observed in this study.
In terms of the behavioral literature on top executive compensation, the results discussed thus far are distinctive in going beyond the overtly political questions surrounding CEO compensation, such as whether powerful CEOs pressure boards into raising the level of CEO cash compensation, to show that powerful CEOs may also exercise influence more subtly by politically managing the form of CEO compensation, as in the decoupling of LTIP adoption and use.
Attention to the subtle aspects of influence attempts may be increasingly relevant in future CEO compensation research, given increasing stakeholder vigilance of executive compensation and related corporate governance issues (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Useem, 1992; Fortune, 1993). To the extent that stakeholders focus on more obvious aspects of compensation policy, such as the level of pay, intraorganizational political activity may be redirected toward the nuances of compensation contracts, such as the form of pay. In effect, just as companies seek little-known loopholes in government regulations, corporate elites may capitalize on analogous loopholes in stakeholders' demands about compensation practices. Finally, such a political interpretation of the decoupling described here is consistent with DiMaggio's (1988) recent call for institutional theorists to address more directly the role of individual political interests in shaping institutional practices.
Other results suggest that boards use impression management in response to poor performance. Independent of CEO influence over the board, declining prior performance is positively related to the likelihood of LTIP adoption but not to the likelihood or magnitude of subsequent grants in actual compensation packages. Thus it appears that LTIP adoption frequently represents a symbolic rather than a purely substantive adaptation to poor performance. In effect, boards facing the pressures associated with a firm's poor performance may seek to restore their credibility with stakeholders by ceremonially increasing control over management (Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992) . LTIP adoption can provide an opportunity for the firm to manage stakeholders' impressions about CEO compensation and the role of compensation in organizational affairs (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi and Reiss, 1981 We believe that the observed growing separation of LTIP adoption and use over time provides a powerful and original test of institutionalization. Prior tests of the institutionalization hypothesis have tended to rely on whether particular independent variables capturing technical indicators are differentially strong for a set of early adopters versus another set of late adopters (e.g., Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) . While such studies are valuable, the modelling approach used can be subject to the criticism that (1) the particular technical factors specified have simply been replaced by other increasingly important technical factors that were not measured, and (2) no institutional factors are ever measured. This study examines more directly whether the institutional decoupling of substance and symbol is greater for late than for early adopters, as captured in the equation predicting LTIP use versus non-use for those organizations that have adopted. By specifying and measuring dependent variables that are derived from institutional theory, as we do in examining adoption and use separately, and observing the increase in this decoupling over time, this approach offers a distinct test of institutional predictions and allows for stronger inference. Finally, the findings of our more traditional test of early versus late adopters are consistent with prior institutional research but are distinctive in showing not only that the predictive strength of prior performance variables are weaker for late adopters but also that the CEO-power variables exhibit a similar pattern.
The theoretical perspective and empirical findings of the present study suggest other avenues for future research on corporate governance issues. One would involve examining whether other apparently substantive changes in corporate governance features may also be largely symbolic. For example, increasing the number and/or proportion of outsiders on the board of directors, as recommended by some activists interested in governance reform (Fortune, 1993), could be a more symbolic than substantive action, given that CEOs may simply recruit sympathetic outsiders to the board (Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990). While such changes may enhance the formal structural bases of board power, they may nevertheless decrease the board's informal power over management if CEOs effectively control the selection process. At the same time, while changes in board structure are highly visible to stakeholders, the reality of those changes and their consequences for the board's relationship with the CEO are less apparent to outside observers; stakeholders may be "unable to discern what outcomes they are obtaining or the value of such outcomes," thus making it easier for boards to take symbolic action (Pfeffer, 1981: 28 ).
There may be limits, however, to how much substance and symbol can be decoupled in corporate governance issues, since alterations in CEO compensation and board structure can carry substantial risk for the CEO. An important question for future research would be under what circumstances informal bases of control, such as norms of reciprocity and friendship ties, are less reliable than formal bases of control. In comparison with LTIPs, alterations in board structure may produce a more fundamental change in the bases of board power and thus represent a relatively risky means of symbolic action. Thus future research might examine whether the use of such risky symbolic actions in the area of corporate governance are used only after less risky actions have been taken. It may be that LTIPs belong to a class of organizational innovations that are both symbolic and substantive and whose formal features can be decoupled at relatively low cost from actual practices. Similar innovations might include quality circles and affirmative action rules. Future research should examine whether organizational practices or policies whose adoption entails extensive political, cognitive, or financial resource commitments are as well-suited to potential decoupling. Devoting greater attention to the study of how, or under what circumstances, internal political processes affect the adoption and subsequent implementation of innovations would help us learn more about both institutionalization and diffusion. It would also teach us to be more skeptical. As this study shows, assuming from the fact of its adoption that an innovation has been implemented may be mistaking a symbolic action for a substantive change. When the purpose of innovations is controversial or ambiguous, as it is in CEO compensation practices, substance and symbolism may be particularly likely to diverge. The payoffs for recognizing this divergence could be great.
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